Part 1: Strategic and Operational Context
The Second Battle of Ream’s Station occurred about eight miles south of Petersburg, Virginia on a watering station of the Weldon and Petersburg railroad, and where the Halifax Road into Petersburg which paralleled the railroad intersected the Dinwiddie Stage Road. The battle occurred here because there were pre-existing fortifications for the Union Second Corps to use that were leftover from the First Battle of Ream’s Station as an interior defense against a Confederate exterior maneuver assault from a larger force. (See Figure 1) The action was a part of the Union Army’s attempt to capture Petersburg, Virginia. The Union Army was attempting to capture Petersburg as the transportation and supply key to the capture of the Confederate capital, Richmond. In June of 1864, after continuous flanking operations against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia in its Overland Campaign, the Union Army was stalemated at Cold Harbor, Virginia. In a joint operation, Grant began an unexpected flanking action to capture Petersburg, Virginia. Petersburg was Grant’s objective because its rail lines supplied the Confederate capital and the Army of Northern Virginia. (Bowery 17-22)
The Union’s Overland spring campaign started in May 1864 and featured for the first time a coordinated simultaneous assault in all the theaters of the war. (See Figure 3) Grant’s strategy was to prevent the Confederates from being able to use their interior lines to reinforce one another. Accordingly, as Grant surrounded the Richmond/Petersburg perimeter, Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was trapped in a defense of the Richmond/Petersburg area and only able to shift some forces to and from the Valley of Virginia but no longer to any other parts of the Confederacy. Southern forces in other parts of the Confederacy were similarly constrained due to Union offensives in their theaters. (Bowery 2-17)
Although trapped in a defense of Petersburg, Lee was still attempting to weaken the northern will to conduct the war by inflicting as many casualties upon the Union Army as possible, to thereby influence the upcoming Union Presidential election in November 1864, by creating the conditions for the election of a Union Peace candidate. The strategic objective to weaken the Union’s will to fight and obtain a negotiated peace had been both Jefferson Davis and Lee’s objective from early in the War. (Bowery 40-41)
The Union’s strategic objectives were to destroy the Confederacy’s capability to wage war and to capture its capital at Richmond. Grant’s operational objectives on the Petersburg/Richmond perimeter, were to cut Lee’s food and ammunition supply lines and to stretch the Confederate’s interior lines to the point where somewhere they must break and enable Grant to bring the overwhelming mass of the Union Army to bear on and defeat Lee’s shrinking forces. After it became clear in June of 1864 that Grant could not capture Petersburg and/or Richmond by a direct assault on Lee’s fortifications, Grant began near-continuous operations of maneuver to cut Lee’s supply lines and stretch Lee’s defensive lines. Historians have categorized these operations and the Confederates operations into a number of offensives of the Petersburg Campaign, although they do not fully agree on the definitions. (Hess xvii) The Union and Confederate commands did not so conceive them. It appears that Grant conceived continuous operations with maximum pressure on all fronts to achieve a victory before the fall of 1864 elections. Both Grant and Lee understood that the Union’s center of gravity rested with the political will of the North to continue the war that had a strategic objective, post-emancipation proclamation, of a reunification of the United States with slavery eliminated.
Following Hess’s categorization, the Union offensives and raids of the Petersburg Campaign were: First, 15-18 June 1864, attempt to capture Petersburg; Second, 22-23 June 1864, attempt to extend the line to the west; Wilson-Kautz cavalry raid, 22-29 June 1864, disrupt railroads; Third, 26-30 July 1864, complex attempt to attack Richmond, cavalry raid a railroad, and direct assault the Petersburg fortification with a mine; Fourth, 14-25 August 1864, attack on both flanks, at Richmond and at the Weldon Railroad, the battle that is the subject of this paper, the Second Battle of Ream’s Station ends the Fourth offensive; Fifth, 29 September – 2 October 1864, both flanks to extend lines; Sixth, 27 Oct 1864, simultaneous attacks on the Richmond and Petersburg’s left to cut supply lines; Seventh, 5-7 February 1865, cut rail and road lines and extend to the west; Eighth, 29 March – 1 April 1865, flanked Lee’s right; and, Ninth, 2 April 1865, a direct assault that broke Confederate lines and caused the Confederate Army’s evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond. During this period the Confederates were mainly in a defensive posture operating on interior lines to defend the Richmond-Petersburg perimeter. Lee, however, did undertake three offensives, these were per Hess: First, 24 June 1864, an attempt to collapse the Union right near Petersburg; Second, 7 October 1864, an attempt to collapse the Army of the James right flank near Richmond; and, Third, 25 March 1865, an attack on the Union’s Ft Steadman to cover the Confederate withdrawal from Richmond/Petersburg. (Hess xvi-xxi)
At the end of the Fourth Union Petersburg Offensive, the Second Battle of Ream’s Station occurred after the Union’s Fifth Corps in a flanking maneuver had successfully captured and defended from counter-attack a portion of the Weldon Railroad at Globe Tavern near Petersburg. (See Figure 2) Grant directed two divisions of the Army of the Potomac’s Second Corps to conduct a shaping operation by tearing up the track of the Weldon railroad south from Globe Tavern to Stoney Creek where the Confederates were in force. Grant hoped to use the shaping operation as a lure to get Lee’s forces to come out from behind their entrenchments to do battle with the larger Union forces. The battle of Ream’s Station, Virginia occurred on the 25th of August 1864 between 2 divisions of the Union’s Army of the Potomac’s Second Corps commanded by Major General Winfield Scott Hancock and the Confederate Third Corps commanded by Lieutenant General A.P. Hill. The battle was the final event in Union General Ulysses S. Grant’s Fourth Offensive in his Petersburg Campaign, 14-25 August 1864. The Fourth Petersburg offensive started with Grant directed simultaneous attacks on both Confederate flanks. The attacks ended with a Union repulse at Deep Bottom on the Confederate left, and the Union’s successful capture of the Weldon Railroad at Globe Tavern on the Confederate right. (Hess 124-141)
By August 1864, the Confederate situation was dire. The Confederates had lost significant territory to the Union, the Union had split the Confederacy in two, and controlled the Mississippi River. The Confederacy’s finances were in a state of collapse, and it had only one remaining port open, Wilmington, the one that supplied Lee using the Weldon railroad. Confederate logistics were unable to keep its Army’s supplied. The loss of Kentucky and its horse farms meant that the Confederate Cavalry would shortly be unhorsed. Manpower losses had the Confederate government considering using slaves as soldiers in exchange for manumission. Yet, despite this Confederate Army morale remained high, and the population banked their hopes on the election of a Union Peace candidate in the 1864 elections with the end of the war in a negotiated peace. (Koistinen 197-281)
On the Union side, by late August 1864, Lee had inflicted massive casualties on Grant during the overland campaign and Lincoln was receiving political threats from within his own party in addition to the continuing threats from the Peace Democrats. In fact, at this point, Lincoln doubted whether he could be re-elected. On August 23rd, 1864, Lincoln had his cabinet sign the back of an envelope. In it was a plan that assumed that a Democratic Peace candidate would win the 1864 Presidential election, and the now lame-duck Lincoln administration would have to win the war before the inauguration of the new administration could take place. (Waugh 360) The gold price and the dollar price which were objective indicators supported Lincoln’s conclusion. In July of 1864, as Confederate General Jubal Early’s forces attacked the outskirts of Washington, Gold reached its highest price in the war, and the dollar fell to its lowest value. Grant’s Overland Campaign had incurred over 84,000 Union casualties. Grant was stalemated around Richmond/Petersburg, Sherman was blocked in front of Atlanta, and none of the other Union initiatives had been successful. (Horn, 1991 1-2) The war had required the Union to institute a direct income tax, and a draft although one could get out of the draft by paying a bounty for a substitute. The consequence of the draft and bounty was that Union forces were being replenished with mercenaries in units that had little training or incentive to risk their lives in the war effort. Canadians, German and Irish immigrants made up a significant portion of those being paid to serve in the Union Army. In this depressing context, with Lee attempting to further negatively impact Union morale, the Second Battle of Ream’s Station battle was fought in a fortified area around Ream’s Station, Virginia on the line of the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad parallel to the Halifax road. The battle was fought from late morning on 25 August 1864 to 9 PM when the Union withdrew back to its main fortifications around Petersburg. (Horn 1991 122-176)
For the Union, the battle was a defensive engagement along interior lines. The Union Second Corps was in the process of conducting a shaping exercise and extending the Union interior line by destroying the Confederate Petersburg and Weldon Railroad from the area where the railroad was captured by the Union Fifth Corps at Globe Tavern, Virginia on 21 August 1864 to Stony Creek Station, Virginia approximately 20 miles below Globe Tavern. While in the vicinity of Ream’s Station, 8 miles below Globe Tavern, the Union Second Corps received a surprise attack from the Confederates. (Horn 1991 122-176) For General Lee, the battle was a battle of maneuver on exterior lines. Lee ordered the Confederate Third Corps to leave the Petersburg defensive perimeter to attack and destroy the smaller Union force. General Lee attempted to inflict maximum casualties on Union forces to weaken Union political will and influence the upcoming Presidential election and to disrupt the Union shaping operation and preserve the Confederate supply offload point at Stoney Creek Station. In this engagement, he was successful in both aims—the Confederates inflicted massive casualties, and preserved Stoney Creek as their railroad terminus for supplies. The Union was not successful in its strategic aims. Meade did not follow through with providing the massive reinforcements to the Second Corps that would have enabled the Union to catch Lee’s forces out in the open from behind the Petersburg trenches and destroy them. Meade had such forces available but was afraid of the Confederates getting in his rear and used the available forces to protect his lines of communication from penetration as a primary objective and the reinforcement of Hancock as a secondary objective with the consequence of insuring Hancock’s rather than A.P. Hills’s defeat.
The extent of the Confederate and Union fortifications and the need to man them at least minimally were geographical considerations that limited the forces that could be applied to the Second Battle of Ream’s Station. Grant had the Army of the James on the perimeter of Richmond, part of the Army of Potomac had been sent to pursue Early in the Shenandoah Valley with the mission to eliminate that threat to Washington DC, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. The remaining forces were allocated to maintaining pressure on the Petersburg perimeter. Meade and Grant believed that they could only afford to use 1 or 2 divisions to allocate to the secondary objective of tearing up the Weldon railroad to Rowanty Creek.
Similarly, Lee’s need to maintain at least a single line of troops in the Petersburg trenches meant that he could only afford to send a reinforced Army Corps slightly larger than Union’s Second Corps to the attack. (See Figure 2)
The rain that had turned the Virginia roads to mud limited the artillery that Union Second Corps brought on its mission, and the availability of the poorly sited and constructed fortifications at Ream’s Station meant that the Union would use them for defense with little thought as to their suitability.
The lines of operation for the Union forces were the Halifax Road coming down from Globe Tavern on the Second Corps line of march, and the Jerusalem Plank Road to its east also leading back to the Petersburg lines. The Confederate lines of operation stretched from the Petersburg trenches to the Dinwiddie Stage Road, and from the Halifax Road as it came north from Rowanty Creek where the Confederates had a significant infantry and cavalry presence to protect railhead there.
On the day of the battle at Ream’s Station, the Union Second Corps consisted of two divisions of infantry, approximately 6000 men, three brigades of cavalry at approximately 2,000 cavalrymen, and 16 pieces of artillery. The Confederates had a reinforced infantry Corps but with straggling it probably numbered at best 5,000 effective at the battle. Hampton had about 3,000 cavalrymen who mostly fought dismounted, and 25 pieces of artillery. A significant factor in Confederate combat effectiveness in addition to their advantage in artillery was the presence of Confederate sharpshooter battalions. (Horn 2015 Location 5309)
The lines of operation for the Union forces were the Halifax Road coming down from Globe Tavern on the Second Corps line of march, and the Jerusalem Plank Road to its east also leading back to the Petersburg lines. The Confederate lines of operation stretched from the Petersburg trenches to the Dinwiddie Stage Road, and from the Halifax Road as it came north from Rowanty Creek where the Confederates had a significant infantry and cavalry presence to protect railhead there.
On the day of the battle at Ream’s Station, the Union Second Corps consisted of two divisions of infantry, approximately 6000 men, three brigades of cavalry at approximately 2,000 cavalrymen, and 16 pieces of artillery. The Confederates had a reinforced infantry Corps but with straggling it probably numbered at best 5,000 effective soldiers at the battle. Hampton had about 3,000 cavalrymen who mostly fought dismounted, and 25 pieces of artillery. A significant factor in Confederate combat effectiveness in addition to their advantage in artillery was the presence of Confederate sharpshooter battalions. (Horn 2015 Location 5309)
Table 1: Events Leading up to the Battle
| Date | Event |
| June 29 | First Battle of Ream’s Station. Confederates tried to trap Union Cavalry under Wilson and Kautz who were returning from a raid to disrupt Confederate rail lines. The initial fortification next to Reams was put there by the Confederates. |
| July 11 | Lee used Early’s Corps to threaten Washington to get Grant’s troops recalled from the Petersburg/Richmond area. Early attacked the suburbs of Washington, DC, and although repulsed, badly shook Union confidence. |
| July 18 | Lincoln called for a draft of an additional 500,000 men and received threats of forcible resistance in the Northern States. |
| July 30 | Confederate General Early burned Chambersburg, Pennsylvania which negatively impacted the Union’s political will. The Battle of the Crater was a Union fiasco which further depressed Union Army morale. |
| July 31 | In a conference at Fort Monroe, Virginia, despite the Union public’s crisis of confidence and political threats to the Administration, Lincoln, and Grant decided to maintain the strategy to press the Confederacy in all Theaters of War. |
| August 4 | Given all the bad war news, Congress requested and Lincoln declared in the Union a national day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer. |
| August 9 | Grant narrowly escaped death from the Confederate Secret Service sabotage of an ammunition barge at City Point, Virginia. |
| August 14-20 | The Union Second Corps is engaged in the Second Battle of Deep Bottom, Virginia. |
| August 18 – 21 | The Union Fifth Corps seized and held a position on the Weldon Railroad. The Confederate counterattack failed to dislodge the Fifth Corps. The withdrawal of the Second Corps from Deep Bottom through rain and mud to a position on the Fifth Corps’ right to support against further Confederate counter attacks. (See Figure 2) |
| August 22 | Two Divisions of the Union Second Corps and three cavalry brigades are ordered tear up the Weldon Railroad from Globe Tavern to Rowanty Creek. |
| August 23 | Confederate Wade Hampton’s Cavalry observed the Union Second Corps movement south from Petersburg lines, and skirmished with Union Cavalry west of Ream’s Station. Hampton determined that the Union Second Corps was vulnerable and recommended an attack. Lee concurred and ordered A.P. Hill’s reinforced infantry Corps and Hampton’s Cavalry to attack. Back in Washington, DC, Lincoln predicted his own defeat in the November elections. |
| August 24 | Union Second Corps infantry reached Ream’s Station, occupied the existing fortification, and destroyed the railroad facilities. The Confederate forces under A.P. Hill left the Petersburg trenches to attack the Union Second Corps. Confederate movements were observed by a Union signal tower and Meade warned Hancock of the movement. |
| August 25 | The Second Battle of Ream’s Station. |
Figure 1: Existing Confederate built fortifications on the Weldon Railroad at Ream’s Station[1] (Bearss modified by Kelly)
The yellow lines depict the unoccupied fortifications that were in place and were used by the Union’s Second Army Corps as it worked its way down the Weldon Railroad from Globe Tavern on 23-24 August 1864 toward the railroad’s intersection with Rowanty Creek. Note that the left (west) of the railroad blocks the east-west Dinwiddie Stage Road, and the position to the north is oriented to block the southern movement on the Halifax Road.
[1] After the war, General Francis A. Walker wrote about the Second Battle of Ream’s Station in his history of the Union’s Second Corps and in other articles. He speculated that the Union Cavalry or the Union Sixth Corps built the initial Ream’s Station fortification during the First Battle of Ream’s Station on 29 June 1864. However, the Official Records, though, contains a map of the First Battle of Ream’s Station. The map shows that the fort was a Confederate position. Put there by Rebel infantry to block the escape of the Union cavalry to the west, and to block a Union Sixth Corps infantry rescue effort from the north. (Walker; 582; Official Records, 1864_06_29_XL, Part1,633, Map1)
Figure 2: Union and Confederate forces at the end of the Battle for Globe Tavern. (USMA 1962)
Figure 3: Grant’s Strategic All Theater 1864 Plan (Krasnoborski and Martini)
References:
Bearss, Edwin C. Petersburg Troop Movement Map, Manuscript on file at Petersburg National Battlefield, National Park Service: Second Battle of Reams Station, August 25, 1864, Topo Map.
Bearss, Edwin C., and Bryce A. Suderow. The Petersburg Campaign. 2 vols. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012.
Bowery, Charles R. The Richmond-Petersburg Campaign, 1864-65. Battles and Leaders of the American Civil War. 2014. text.
Hess, Earl J. In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat. Civil War America. 2009. text.
Horn, John. The Destruction of the Weldon Railroad, Deep Bottom, Globe Tavern, and Reams Station, August 14-25, 1864. The Virginia Civil War Battles and Leaders Series the Petersburg Campaign. 1st ed. Lynchburg, Va.: H.E. Howard, Inc., 1991.
———. The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864. First edition. ed. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2015.
Koistinen, Paul A. C. Beating Plowshares into Swords. Modern War Studies. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1996.
Krasnoborski, Edward J. and Martini, Frank. The History Department at the United States Military Academy, Department Maps. West Point, NY: On-line. Available from internet, http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/index.htm, accessed 22 Dec 07 by https://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/civilwar/articles/suntzuoverland.aspx#.
United States Military Academy. Department of Military Art and Engineering, Vincent J Esposito, and Inc Frederick A. Praeger. The West Point atlas of the Civil War. [New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962] Map. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <www.loc.gov/item/map62000023/>.
United States. War Department., and Robert N. Scott. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 69 vols. Gettysburg, National Historical Society, 1971. Digital version of the original edition (Washington: G.P.O., 1880-1901) http://resolver.library.cornell.edu/moap/anu4519.
